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[1619] 
Poor Women and the Protective State 
Khiara M. Bridges 
This Article puts poor, pregnant women’s current experience with the state into 
conversation with the science of prenatal and early childhood brain development and 
looks at the effect on women’s autonomy of government regulation of individual 
behaviors that may harm fetal brain development. Drawing upon ethnographic fieldwork 
with poor, pregnant women that reveals that indigent women’s current experience with the 
regulatory state is one in which their autonomy is already grossly compromised, this 
Article argues that the infringement on vulnerable populations’ privacy rights is 
guaranteed should the government attempt to manage or reduce assaults on prenatal 
brain development through the regulation of individual behaviors. Regulations that focus 
on individuals should be drafted with a focus on social justice in order to protect the 
autonomy of poor women affected by these laws. This Article suggests, however, that a 
better approach is regulation on the macro-level—through legislation that requires 
product testing and prevents manufacturers from introducing certain chemicals into the 
marketplace or environment. 
 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston University. J.D., 
Columbia Law School; Ph.D., Columbia University Department of Anthropology. Thanks are owed to 
the participants in the Law & Policy of the Developing Brain conference for the thought-provoking 
conversation, as well as to the staff members of the Hastings Law Journal for their help with this 
Article. 
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Research in the neurosciences has demonstrated that there are many 
categories of chemicals that may adversely affect the developing brain. The 
sheer ubiquity of these chemicals is staggering, and our exposure to them 
seems unavoidable; indeed, they are present in everything from the food 
supply to flame retardants, pesticides, jewelry upholstered furniture, and 
domestic animals.1 
The goal of this Article is to put poor, pregnant women’s current 
experience with the state into conversation with the science of prenatal 
and early childhood brain development. Specifically, this Article asks 
how the autonomy of poor, pregnant women and mothers may be 
impacted by government regulation of individual behaviors that may 
harm fetal brain development. Based on indigent women’s current 
experience with the regulatory state, the infringement on vulnerable 
populations’ privacy rights is guaranteed should the government attempt 
to manage or reduce assaults on prenatal brain development through the 
regulation of individual behaviors. This Article suggests that the preferable 
route of regulation is on the macro level—through legislation that requires 
manufacturers to test their products for the neurodevelopmental hazards 
they pose or else prohibits or limits the introduction of harmful chemicals 
into the marketplace and the environment. If the regulatory focus is on the 
individual, however, the question of social justice should be at the 
forefront of drafters’ minds in order to reduce the inevitable autonomy-
reducing effects that it will have on poor women. 
Beginning in the spring of 2005, I conducted anthropological 
fieldwork for eighteen months in the obstetrics clinic of a public hospital 
in Manhattan.2 Most of the women receiving prenatal care in the clinic 
during that time relied upon Medicaid, specifically the New York State 
Prenatal Care Assistance Program (“PCAP”), to cover the costs of their 
healthcare.3 My research revealed that poor women’s current experience 
with the regulatory state, as dramatized by their experience navigating 
the requirements of PCAP, is one in which their autonomy is denied and 
their privacy rights and expectations are presumed to be nonexistent or 
negligible. There are many PCAP requirements that allow the government 
access to certain intimate provinces of poor women’s lives. However, the 
two requirements most relevant to the potential regulation of assaults on 
 
 1. See generally Tracey Woodruff et al., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA 240-R-03-001, 
America’s Children and the Environment: Measures of Contaminants, Body Burdens, and 
Illnesses (2003). 
 2. For an extensive analysis of my research in the Alpha obstetrics clinic, see Khiara M. Bridges, 
Reproducing Race: An Ethnography of Pregnancy as a Site of Racialization (2011). 
 3. PCAP is a smaller program within the larger New York State Medicaid program that provides 
comprehensive prenatal care services to women who would otherwise be uninsured or underinsured. 
See N.Y. St. Dep’t of Health Off. of Medicaid Mgmt., Prenatal Care Assistance Program 
(PCAP): Medicaid Policy Guidelines Manual (2007). 
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prenatal brain development are the psychosocial assessment4 and the 
nutritional assessment.5 
During the psychosocial assessment, a social worker screens the 
patient for several “risk factors,” including: (1) The unplanned-ness and/or 
unwanted-ness of the current pregnancy, (2) the woman’s intention to give 
the infant up for adoption or to surrender the infant to foster care, 
(3) HIV-positive status, (4) a history of substance abuse, (5) a lack of 
familial or environmental support, (6) marital or family problems, (7) a 
history of domestic violence, sexual abuse, or depression, (8) mental 
disability, (9) a lack of social welfare benefits, (10) a history of contact 
with child protective services, (11) a history of psychiatric treatment or 
emotional disturbance, and (12) a history of homelessness.6 If a woman 
has a risk factor, the social worker asks more searching questions about it 
because the social worker has the responsibility of connecting the woman 
with other professionals or specialists who may be able to help her.7 
It is an understatement to describe the psychosocial assessment as 
intrusive. Even without a “risk factor,” the woman must submit to a series 
of intimate questions designed to discover relevant information; with a 
“risk factor,” the series of questions grows longer and more intimate. It 
deserves underscoring that women in New York are led into these 
conversations only when they are poor, pregnant, and seeking state-
assisted prenatal care.8 Wealthier women with private insurance can avoid 
enduring such conversations. 
During the nutritional assessment, the patient meets with a 
nutritionist who records any known food or non-food allergies, documents 
whether the patient has had trouble eating due to nausea or vomiting, and 
provides standard information to the patient about the nutritional 
 
 4. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 85.44(d)(6) (2012) (“Providers shall conduct a 
psychosocial assessment of each patient, to identify social, economic, psychological and emotional 
problems which present obstacles to health and treatment. When problems are identified the 
[preferred primary care provider] shall make referral, as appropriate to the patient needs, to the local 
Department of Social Services, community mental health resources, alcohol and substance abuse 
providers and support groups or social/psychological specialists.”). 
 5. Id. § 85.44(d)(7) (“The provider shall establish and implement . . . a program of nutrition 
screening and counseling which includes: (i) individual nutrition risk assessment, including screening for 
specific nutritional risk conditions at the initial visit and continuing reassessment as needed; [and] (ii) 
professional nutrition counseling, monitoring and follow-up of all patients at nutritional risk.”). 
 6. Alpha Hospital Psychosocial Screening Form (on file with Author). 
 7. See Bridges, supra note 2, at 57. 
 8. See id. at 89–90 (observing that only the most savvy women can avoid the intrusiveness of the 
PCAP informational canvassing, which can be done by receiving care from a healthcare provider who 
accepts PCAP/Medicaid but who is not affiliated with a hospital and therefore has the discretion 
(produced by the lack of institutional oversight) to ignore his legal obligation to conduct an informational 
canvassing). 
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requirements of pregnant women.9 Afterwards, the patient is asked to 
recount what she ate for breakfast, lunch, and dinner the previous day.10 
She is then given an itemized food chart—for example, milk, cheese, 
eggs, fruit, vegetables, chocolate, and candy.11 She is asked to circle how 
many times per day or per week she consumes the foods. In the event that 
the nutritionist deems the patient’s diet unsatisfactory (which appeared to 
be a standard practice during my time in the clinic), she checks a box 
labeled “inadequate/unusual dietary habits.”12 The patient is then asked to 
make a verbal commitment to meet the nutritional needs of herself and 
her fetus.13 
In many cases, the nutritional assessment is not a patient’s only 
encounter with a nutritionist. If at any point during a woman’s pregnancy, 
her provider feels that she has gained too much or not enough weight, she 
must participate in additional consultations with the nutritionist.14 It 
deserves underscoring that women in New York are only led into these 
relationships of dietary surveillance when they are poor, pregnant, and 
seeking state-assisted prenatal care. Wealthier women with private 
insurance can avoid enduring such surveillance. 
The effect of the consultations with the nutritionist and social 
worker, as well as the other professionals with which pregnant women 
must consult,15 is that poor women’s private lives are made available for 
state surveillance and problematization. Pursuant to the PCAP mandate, 
private information about women’s health16 and economic statuses17 is 
 
 9. Id. at 54. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 56–57. 
 15. These include a Medicaid financial officer and a nurse or health educator. See N.Y. Comp. 
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 85.44(c)(1)(ii) (2012) (“Facility staff shall assist the patient with 
arrangements or make arrangements for the patient for off-site services, facilitate receipt of those 
services, monitor reports of results of off-site services, and integrate results into patient records.”); id. 
§ 85.44(d) (“The facility shall provide, directly or by contract, . . . services . . . [including] family 
planning . . . and prenatal care and services.”). 
 16. Information about women’s health status is obtained by a registered nurse, who takes the 
woman’s medical history with guidance provided by a standardized form produced by the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”): the ACOG Antepartum Record. See ACOG 
Antepartum Record, Form A, available at http://forms.twobgyn.com/Forms/ACOG_Forms.pdf. ACOG is 
a nonprofit organization comprised of physicians that sets standards of healthcare in the OB/GYN 
specialty. See Carolyn Jacobs Chachkin, What Potent Blood: Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and 
the Transformation of Modern Prenatal Care, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 9, 33–35 (2007) (noting that the 
guidelines that ACOG articulates for the practices of obstetrics and gynecology frequently become the 
standards of care). The ACOG Antepartum Record solicits sociological data such as birth date, age, 
marital status and, interestingly, race. See ACOG Antepartum Record, supra. Moreover, it solicits 
information about the woman’s history with a number of medical problems that may complicate 
pregnancy and childbirth, including diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, gynecologic surgery, 
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gathered and recorded. Their diets are quantified and censured.18 Their 
histories with substance abuse, sexual abuse, public assistance, and any 
form of contact with the state are considered significant and relevant.19 In 
essence, a poor, pregnant woman’s privacy interest—that is, her interest 
in preventing the government from intruding into her personal, intimate 
affairs—has been violated. 
Moreover, this invasion of poor, pregnant women’s privacy facilitates 
the enduring surveillance and regulation, and potential punishment, of 
poor families by the state. Subsequent to enrolling in PCAP, the state has 
all the information necessary to sweep poor families within the ambit of 
child protective services, the foster care system, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and, if deemed necessary, the criminal justice system. 
PCAP is not unique to New York State; several other states’ 
Medicaid-funded prenatal care programs are similar insofar as they 
require pregnant women to submit to nonmedical assessments. For 
example, “nutrition services,”20 “health education services,”21 and 
“psychosocial services”22 are offered to poor, pregnant women as part of 
California’s Comprehensive Perinatal Services Program. This statute 
makes clear what should be covered as part of health education services: 
[C]urrent health practices; past experience with health care delivery 
systems; prior experience with and knowledge about pregnancy, prenatal 
care, delivery, postpartum self-care, infant care, and safety; client’s 
expressed learning needs; formal education and reading level; learning 
methods most effective for the client; educational needs related to 
diagnostic impressions, problems, and/or risk factors identified by staff; 
languages spoken and written; mental, emotional, or physical disabilities 
that affect learning; mobility/residency; religious/cultural influences that 
impact upon perinatal health; and client and family or support person’s 
motivation to participate in the educational plan.23 
The statute is equally clear about psychosocial service coverage: 
[C]urrent status including social support system; personal adjustment 
to pregnancy; history of previous pregnancies; patient’s goals for 
herself in this pregnancy; general emotional status and history; wanted 
or unwanted pregnancy, acceptance of the pregnancy; substance use 
 
anesthetic complications, and uterine anomalies. Id. 
 17. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 18. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. 
 19. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 20. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, § 51348(c) (2012) (“A complete initial nutrition assessment shall be 
performed at the initial [prenatal care] visit . . . . [and] at least once every trimester . . . . that addresses 
[t]he prevention and/or resolution of nutrition problems. . . . [with the goal of] helping the patient 
understand the importance of . . . maintain[ing] good nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”). 
 21. Id. § 51348(d). 
 22. Id. § 51348(e). 
 23. Id. § 51348(d)(2)(A). 
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and abuse; housing/household; education/employment; and financial/ 
material resources.24 
Moreover, pregnant women must be reassessed every trimester during 
their pregnancy and once again postpartum.25 
In Massachusetts, the Medicaid prenatal care program requires that 
providers give health-care counseling, which includes instruction on 
“hygiene and nutrition during pregnancy” as well as “family planning.”26 
Moreover, the provider is required to refer the patient to a social worker, 
“as needed.”27 In Illinois, the Medicaid statute has spelled out in exacting 
detail an exhaustive itemization of services that providers must give to 
poor, pregnant women seeking prenatal care.28 As part of the standard 
medical history that a healthcare provider asks of a patient, he must gather 
information about her “social and occupational . . . background, health 
habits, [and] previous pregnancies.”29 The patient must also have 
counseling with respect to a wide range of issues, including physical 
activity and exercise, child care arrangements, and parenting skills, 
including:  
meeting the physical, emotional and intellectual needs of the infant, with 
specific appraisal to detect parents at risk of child abuse or 
neglect[;] . . . [e]motional and social changes occasioned by the birth of a 
child, including changes in marital and family relationships, the special 
needs of the mother in the postpartum period, and preparing the home 
for the arrival of the newborn[;] . . . postpartum family planning 
options[; and] [o]ther relevant topics in response to patient concern.30 
What motivates the state’s inquiry of pregnant women? Ostensibly, 
the government’s interest is in protecting the fetus and the child, once she 
is born, from abuse or neglect.31 The state’s inquest and its ability to 
intrude in provinces that most would describe as “private,” are based on its 
parens patriae power, by which the state has authority to limit individual 
and parental rights in order to protect children.32 This conflict between the 
individual’s interest in protecting herself from state intervention in 
personal and familial matters and the state’s interest in protecting the 
 
 24. Id. § 51348(e)(1)(A). 
 25. Id. § 51348(d)(2)(B), (d)(4). 
 26. 130 Mass. Code Regs. § 433.421(B)(5) (2012). 
 27. Id. § 433.421(B)(4)(c). 
 28. See Ill. Admin. Code tit. 77, § 630.30(b) (2011). 
 29. Id. § 630.30(b)(3)(A). 
 30. Id. § 630.30(b)(3)(L). 
 31. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 833, 846 (2007) 
(observing that the state may intervene in the parent-child relationship in order to protect the child’s 
welfare). 
 32. See Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 31, 42–43 (2006) 
(describing the concept of parens patriae as existing in tension with parental authority and noting that 
the state exercises its power of parens patriae in order to “protect families’ more vulnerable 
members”). 
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child from the parent who raises her is an enduring, recurrent one.33 
While many scholars have criticized the discriminatory enforcement of 
child protection laws, insofar as poor, racially-marginalized families are 
disproportionately swept within the state’s “protective” ambit,34 most 
scholars do not question that it is legitimate for the state to limit 
individual and parental rights when the circumstances demand it.35 
With respect to pregnant women seeking state-assisted prenatal 
healthcare, if the state’s inquisitive net yields information suggesting that 
a woman is likely to put her fetus or child in danger, then it is more likely 
that the state will keep the woman within its regulatory apparatus in order 
to protect this child once it is born. The exhaustiveness of inquiries that 
intrude upon spaces that most consider private might be thought necessary 
because the end goal is the protection of the child. The means to that 
end—the violation of poor women’s rights to privacy—is thought to be an 
unfortunate, yet essential, fact. 
This is the experience of poor, pregnant women with the state; their 
privacy and autonomy is far more limited than the privacy of wealthier 
women who do not have to rely upon the state for assistance. This leads to 
 
 33. This conflict has been explored extensively in the literature analyzing the child protective 
system. See, e.g., Susan Vivian Mangold, Transgressing the Border Between Protection and 
Empowerment for Domestic Violence Victims and Older Children: Empowerment as Protection in the 
Foster Care System, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 69, 74 (2001) (“While parents have a right to raise their 
children free from state intervention, children have a countervailing right to protection from abuse 
and neglect. This tension between parental rights and child protection is the key conflict in the child 
protection system . . . .”). Dorothy Roberts has explored this conflict in her analysis of the 
prosecutions of pregnant drug addicts. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have 
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1422 (1991) 
(“[P]unishing a woman for using drugs during pregnancy pits the state’s interest in protecting the 
future health of a child against the mother’s interest in autonomy over her reproductive life—interests 
that until recently had not been thought to be in conflict.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and 
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 577, 580 (1997) [hereinafter Appell, Protecting 
Children] (“This essay addresses the policies, practices, and perspectives that help to fuel the growing 
industry that has arisen from the state’s ‘protective’ involvement with poor families and families of 
color and the state’s punitive treatment of the mothers of these families.”); Annette R. Appell, Virtual 
Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 683, 770–79 (2001) [hereinafter 
Appell, Virtual Mothers] (describing the predominance of poor families of color within the child 
protection system); Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1225, 1244 
(1999) (noting that poor women are more likely to be swept up within the ambit of child protection 
systems and agencies); Sally K. Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice for All, 
36 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 12–15 (2003) (investigating the causes of the overrepresentation of 
poor and African American children in foster care). 
 35. See Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 34, at 703 (observing that parents have the right to 
raise their children without state interference unless there is proof that they are abusing or neglecting 
their children); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 1207, 1215 (1999) (noting that parental conduct is deferred to unless it is abusive or 
neglectful). 
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the question: What can we expect from laws that are motivated by 
developments in neuroscience that demonstrate the potentially hazardous 
effects of some behaviors on fetal brain development and that are 
designed to regulate those behaviors? We can expect the state to cast an 
even more exhaustive inquisitory net. We can expect the state to ask 
questions about the frequency with which a woman comes into contact 
with flame retardants, pesticides, certain types of jewelry, upholstered 
furniture, domestic animals, and certain foods in the food supply—in 
addition to the questions that the state already asks. Moreover, we can 
expect that the state will maintain a supervisory, regulatory, and 
occasionally punitive presence in even more poor women’s lives than at 
present. 
I should underscore again that while wealthier women and poor 
women may engage in the same potentially harmful behaviors, the 
likelihood that poor women will be “caught” doing them is greater. As law 
professor Annette Appell wrote: 
Poor families are more susceptible to state intervention because they 
lack power and resources and because they are more directly involved 
with governmental agencies. . . . [P]oor families lead more public lives 
than their middle-class counterparts: rather than visiting private 
doctors, poor families are likely to attend public clinics and emergency 
rooms for routine medical care; rather than hiring contractors to fix 
their homes, poor families encounter public building inspectors; rather 
than using their cars to run errands, poor mothers use public 
transportation.36 
In conclusion, we must be attuned to social justice issues should we 
attempt to address the potentially hazardous effects of individual 
behaviors on fetal brain development through law and legal regulation. 
The better approach is a macro-level intervention: Instead of regulating 
the amount of mercury-laden fish a pregnant woman eats, we ought to 
regulate industries so that there is no mercury in the fish. If regulation is 
at the individual level, however, there is a certain inevitability to the 
disparate impact that such regulations will have on poor women. But if 
this impact is on the forefront of the minds of the regulations’ drafters 
then we may be able to avoid the potential damaging effects of the laws. 
That may be the best that we can hope for. 
 
 36. Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 34, at 584 (footnotes omitted). 
